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Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures
in Balise-Based Train Control Systems
Yongdong Wu, Jian Weng, Zhe Tang, Xin Li, and Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In modern rail transport systems, balises are widely
used to exchange track–train information via air-gap interface. In
this paper, we first present the vulnerabilities on the standard balise
air-gap interface, and then conduct vulnerability simulations us-
ing the system parameters that were specified in the European
Train Control System. The simulation results show that the vul-
nerabilities can be exploited to launch effective and practical
attacks, which could lead to catastrophic consequences, such as
train derailment or collision. To mitigate the vulnerabilities and
attacks, we propose to implement a challenge–response authen-
tication process in the air-gap interface in the existing transport
infrastructure.
Index Terms—Cyber–physical system security, ETCS, Balise.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE rail transport system has been in operation for over180 years and has proved to be the most efficient form
of land transportation in terms of capacity, speed, distance and
punctuality. For example, there were 94.68 million Chinese
passenger trips by train on 24 February 2015 (Peak period of
Chinese New Year) [1]. Nowadays, RITS (Railway Intelligent
Transportation System) is deployed with advanced information
and communication technologies in order to meet the growing
demand on higher availability, speed, and efficiency. In an
RITS, a train localization system shall guarantee localization
precision high enough to detect intersecting points in all con-
ditions [2], so that the train control system is able to determine
the train speed profile and alarm operators in a timely man-
ner. Thus, the precise train localization and intelligent control
operation form the core part of RITS.
Although GPS is able to provide location and time infor-
mation in all weather conditions, and is freely accessible to
anyone with a receiver, it is merely used as a supplement
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tool of a transport localization and control system due to
its weaknesses such as unavailability in tunnels and insuffi-
ciently accurate/reliable to distinguish between adjacent tracks.
Instead, wayside infrastructure elements and communication
systems are widely used for localization and control in modern
RITSs. Particularly, a well-known RITS,1 called ETCS (Euro-
pean Train Control System), uses ground-based Eurobalises (or
balises for short) for train localization and control by sending
telegrams to on-board BTMs (Balise Transmission Module),
where the telegrams comprise balise location, rail gradient,
train speed limit etc.
As balises are usually used as position markers which are the
sources of movement authority (“permission to proceed”), the
failure to detect a balise or a series of balises requires immediate
actions such as stopping the train. This is because degraded
balise detection may contribute to serious consequences [5]. As
the telegram transmitted from balise to BTM is considered to be
safety critical, ETCS SUBSET-036 [6] states that “The worst
case for the Balise input-to-output characteristic and field
conformity shall be considered. . . ., The worst case situation for
the On-board Transmission Equipment and for air-gap propa-
gation shall be considered.” Furthermore, it specifies methods
to correct errors due to air-gap noises to ensure integrity of the
telegram. In order to provide better air-gap transmission per-
formance, telepowering signal modeling [7], discrete point po-
sitioning [5], position optimization [8], reliability analysis [9],
crosstalk interference analysis[10] and sensor-fused virtual bali-
ses [11] are proposed as improvements on ETCS SUBSET-036.
Nonetheless, all of the above proposals only concern the
random air-gap noises for improving position accuracy and/or
communication robustness, totally ignoring malicious attacks
on the wireless transmission channels, such as signal jam-
ming, and telegram tampering. Unfortunately, the attacks can
be easily conducted as railways are publicly accessible. Both
theoretical analysis [12] and service failure events [13], [14]
demonstrate the possibility of the accidental interference of
MiFi (Mobile WiFi) on CBTC (Communication-Based Train
Control) radio communication. Even worse, because almost all
balises are localized in open air and the balise-BTM air-gap
interfaces lack cryptographic protection, a train may receive
malicious telegrams which could result in wrong safety-related
response [15], [16]. That is to say, adversaries such as terrorists
are able to maliciously manipulate air-gap interface to cause
inaccurate stops or even fatal accidents.
1As of 2012, more than 62 000 km of railway tracks and 7500 vehicles are
either already operating or being equipped with ETCS in 38 countries around
the world [3], and ETCS is quickly recognized by CTCS (Chinese Train Control
System) [4].
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Fig. 1. ETCS system diagram. Radio block center (RBC) is used in the GSM-R
communication.
The contributions of the paper are fourfold. First, we point
out that the air-gap interface between balise and BTM is totally
insecure as the telegram is sent in cleartext, without integrity
protection and timestamping. While this “open-door” design
makes it easy to realize the inter-operability for pan-European
railways since it does not ask for complicated cryptographic key
management, the design makes the air-gap interface the weak-
est security link in the rail communication system. Secondly,
we present a jamming attack on the balises along a rail track
to cause “balise missing” hazard [6]. This jamming attack is
so powerful that it invalidates the defense mechanism of using
a dedicated wireless spectrum band for rail transport system,
as suggested in [17]. Thirdly, by exploiting the inaccuracy
of on-board positioning mechanisms, we show how a balise
displacement attack is able to convey erroneous position in-
formation to BTM even if telegrams were authenticated. Using
ETCS example parameters [18], we show by simulations that all
the proposed attacks are effective and cost-efficient in causing
fatal train accidents. Finally, we propose countermeasures to
mitigate the attacks.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the preliminaries. Section III presents the vulnerabil-
ities and the attacks in Balise-based Train Control Systems, and
Section IV shows the results of our attack simulations.Section V
presents countermeasures. Section VI draws conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
With reference to [6], this section introduces ETCS model,
balise transmission system, telegram and train speed control
curve.
A. ETCS Model
As shown in Fig. 1, an ETCS consists of a train con-
trol component and a train-ground communication component.
The former captures the train’s inputs, calculates the train
brake mode curve according to the received ground infor-
mation and train characteristics [19], provides DMI (Driver
Machine Interface), and takes some actions directly. The
Fig. 2. Balise is mounted between the tracks, and a Balise Transmission
Module (BTM) is mounted on the train. They cooperate to fulfill the track–train
telegram transmission [16].
latter2 is widely used for exchanging information between train
and control center. The two components are connected via inter-
nal interface between on-board VC (Vital Computer) and BTM.
A balise3 is a wayside device placed between the rails of
a railway, serving as a beacon giving the traffic information
(e.g., location of balise, curve and gradient of rail, and speed
restriction) to any train passing over it. There are two classes
of balises: Fixed Balises and Controllable Balises. The former
merely transmits its locally stored data to on-board BTM; while
the latter is able to bi-directionally forward variable messages
between wayside LEU (Lineside Electronic Unit) and BTM.
LEU may further communicate with a wayside signaling device
and/or a local center, and BTM enables bi-directional inter-
mittent transmission between track and train VC. In order to
distinguish travel directions, balises must be deployed in pairs,
usually consisting of a fixed balise and a controllable balise.
When a train passes over a balise as shown in Fig. 2, its
BTM Antenna telepowers and activates the balise to send stored
messages (called as Uplink data). After obtaining the uplink
data, the on-board BTM Function decodes the uplink data to
geographical position, route data and temporary speed limit
etc. (see Section II-B) and calculates the moving direction (see
Section II-C). Although the received balise position is accurate
and used as location marker, it cannot provide the real-time
position information. To continuously localize the train, other
input sources such as on-board speed sensors may be used and
fused (see Section II-D). With the train position information,
track map and rail data, VC continuously calculates the safe
brake curve (see Section II-E), and real-time supervision limits
of train speed (see Section II-F). VC may send train information
to LEU via BTM-balise downlink, render them on DMI to
the driver, or even take action automatically to prevent the
top-level hazards (see Section II-G) from happening. Briefly,
after obtaining the input, VC determines the train speed control
curves so as to ensure the safety and comfort.
2The train-ground communication component may be GSM-R (GSM
Communications-Railway) communication, train-track communication or both.
As GSM-R communication system is not popular yet, we omit it unless
otherwise stated in the following.
3Euroloop is an extension to balise so as to allow continuous data transmis-
sion up to 1000 m using a leaky coaxial cable.
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B. VC Input 1—Balise Telegram
Considering balise’s crucial role in safety and train operation,
ETCS SUBSET-036 [6] specifies balise telegrams in order to
serve as a solid basis for the inter-operability with any ETCS
compliant on-board equipment. Each telegram includes data
structure, packet type, etc.
1) Data Structure: A balise telegram is either 341-bit “short
telegram” or 1023-bit “long telegram.” It consists of trans-
formed payload, integrity check bits, and synchronization bits.
• Shaped data (913 bits or 231 bits): contains the payload
information (830 or 210 bits). To avoid burst transmission
errors, the payload is scrambled, substituted with code of
different Hamming distance.
• Control bits (3 bits): is a constant binary string “001b” at
present.
• Scrambling bits (12 bit): is the initial state of the
scrambler.
• Extra shaping bits (10 bit): is used to enforce the shap-
ing constraints on the check bits independent of the
scrambling.
• Checksum (85 bit): consists of 75 parity bits of the error
correcting code and 10 bits for synchronization.
2) Packet Type: In order to ensure inter-operability for trains
of different countries, ETCS defines the packet types according
to the payload in the balise specifications [6]. The Uplink packet
types which are related to our study are:
• Position and geographical information.
• Train target running information.
• Permanent speed restrictions.
• Temporary speed restrictions.
• Movement authority which defines the maximum speed
that may be used for a given maximum distance and
maximum time.
• Gradient of rail which contains pairs of rail section
length and gradient (uphill/downhill flag and a number in
percentage).
• Linking data for the relationship of neighbor balises
which informs the train about the distance to the next
balise or balise group and the required train reaction if the
next balise (or balise group) is missing (e.g. train stop).
• Other information.
Every balise telegram must include a 14-bit balise group iden-
tity, a unique balise identity, and packet types such that the VC
can check the source and interpret the telegram.
C. VC Input 2—Travel Direction
As the train direction is critical to decide movement author-
ity, ETCS proposes to determine the train’s travel direction from
the sequence of telegrams sent from at least two linked consec-
utive balises (e.g., the balises within a multi-balise Group) [6].
Every balise group has its own coordinate system. With
reference to Fig. 3, balise B1 is the origin (called position
reference) of the coordinate system for the group. The nominal
direction of the group is defined by increasing internal balise
numbers as B1, B2, . . . etc.
Fig. 3. Balise layout. Each group consists of at most eight balises. Each balise
Bi stores its exact position pi in the rail coordinate system.
Fig. 4. Wheel angular speed sensor [22].
D. VC Input 3—Real-Time Location
As a balise only provides its physical position rather than
train’s real-time position, reliable measurement of speed and/or
location by dead reckoning becomes the base of a safe and effi-
cient ATP (Automatic Train Protection) system. Specifically, to
enable continuous positioning for re-calculating the safe train-to-
train distance, a train obtains its real-time travel distance via sen-
sors. The sensors typically include wheel angular speed sensors,
Doppler radars, accelerometers, and gyroscopes. For instance, the
ATP system named SCMT (Sistema di Controllo Marcia Treno)
for Italian railways measures wheel angular speed to estimate
train speed by counting impulses generated from a sensor per
second and calculates distance between fixed balises [20], [21].
With regard to Fig. 4, a wheel angular speed sensor trans-
forms the rotating velocity of a train wheel into electric pulse
signals according to photoelectric transformation principle [22].
Denote the impulse counter by Λt within a sampling interval t,
the average wheel angular speed ω is evaluated as
ω =
2π
N
· Λt · 1
t
(1)
where N is the number of impulses per wheel revolution. Thus
the measured travel distance is
s˜ = ωrt =
2π
N
· Λt · r (2)
where r is the radius of the train wheel. Therefore, the on-board
system is able to continuously measure the real-time travel
distance. Nonetheless, the reliability of the on-board measure-
ment is tightly related to operative conditions which are often
unpredictable and unquantifiable due to wheel sliding/skidding,
raining, snowing etc.
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Fig. 5. Safe braking distance curve. Train speed must be 0 at the target position.
According to [19], if two consecutive linked balises (groups)
announced by the linking field in the telegram are not detected
and the end of the expectation window of the second balise
(group) has been passed, the on-board ETCS device shall
command the service brake. Based on the on-board distance
measurement above, the detection method can be as follows.
Denote the impulse counter for traveling between balises Bi
and Bi−1 as Λti , and the position of balise Bi as pi which is
included in the telegram and the train route map. For simplicity,
the balise position pi (i.e., coordinate) is defined along the rail
in this paper. For any two balises Bi and Bi−1, their distance
calculated with telegram payload is
si = pi − pi−1 (3)
and according to (2), the measured distance is given by
s˜i =
2π
N
· Λti · r. (4)
If |s˜i − si| > i for some predefined threshold i, the VC
regards that balise Bi is missing, and alerts the driver.
E. VC Output 1—Safe Braking Distance Curve
Since every rail section has a permitted speed limit due to
operational or environmental conditions, in case of violation
of the permitted speed limit, the on-board VC must activate
service or emergency brake [23]. To be compliant with the
rail restriction, using the input such as brake, train and track
characteristics as well as real-time measured speed as (1), VC
calculates the safe braking distance curve as shown in Fig. 5.
When a train is at the warning position, the braking distance
is the difference between warning position and target position,
and the protected curve shows the maximal admissible speed
to enable the train to stop at the target position. For instance,
the train braking distance for a 410 m long German ICE
train at a speed 300 km/h is found as 4000 m [24]; and the
emergency brake distance of China CRH2-300 is about 3634 m
in a smooth and straight high speed railway when the brake
initial speed is 300 km/h [25]. Similar braking distance curves
can be found in the literature [26]–[32].
F. VC Output 2—Train Supervision Limit
Although the safe braking distance curve is able to guide the
travel safety, it does not ensure the travel comfort if the driver
brakes the train frequently. Since DMI is very important in the
train control process to drive comfortably by maintaining the
speed of the train within the appropriate limits, ETCS specifies
Fig. 6. Emergency braking distance (EBD) curve and supervision limits [18].
DMI of “Cab Signaling,” especially for full supervision [18],
with 5 supervision limits shown in Fig. 6:
• Indication (I)—leave the driver enough time to act on
the service brake so that the train does not overpass the
Permitted speed (P).
• Permitted speed (P)—leave the driver an additional time
to act on the service brake so that the train will not overpass
the point beyond which VC will trigger a brake command.
• Warning (W)—give an additional audible warning after
the Permitted speed has been overpassed.
• Service Brake Intervention (SBI)—take into account the
service brake building up time so that the EBI supervision
limit is not reached after the command of the full service
brake effort.
• Emergency Brake Intervention (EBI)—bypass the driver
and command the intervention of the emergency brake.
When the train crosses any of these supervision limits, the
driver shall be alerted through appropriate graphics, colors and
sounds on DMI.
G. Balise-Related Hazards
On account of the importance of position information, ETCS
[6] emphasizes the following requirements on BTM:
R1) Predicate position references (see Fig. 3).
R2) Filter out erroneous telegrams. Section II-B introduces
one of the filtering methods.
R3) Repeatedly detect the existence of a balise as long as
the vehicle is in driving mode (running or stationary).
Section II-D introduces one detection method.
Whenever a rail transport system is in operation, the above
requirements R1)–R3) shall be ready for non-intentional inter-
ference. Otherwise, there are top-level ETCS hazards [6]:
H1) Erroneous report of the existence of a balise.
H2) Erroneous telegram interpretable as correct.
H3) Erroneous localization of a balise with reception of a
valid telegram.
H4) Balise Missing.
III. SECURITY VULNERABILITIES IN BALISE-BASED
TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS
In the ETCS speed control mechanism introduced in
Sections II-E and F, accurate balise position information is
crucial for the trains. If the balise position information are
accidentally or maliciously wrong, disasters, such as derail-
ment, collision and infrastructure damage, could happen [33].
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Fig. 7. Faking the attack. The faked balise B˜n sends the wrong rail information
to the passing-over BTM. (Circle) Position of Bi and (diamond) position of B˜i
along a rail.
A. Security Model
An adversary aims to cause top-level hazards H1)–H4) by in-
validating the requirements R1)–R3) mentioned in Section II-G.
To this end, he will attack the balise-based transport system
assume that he is
1) Able to interfere the air-gap wireless communication. As
the telegram is sent in open air via a wireless channel, it
can be easily interfered by an attacker with a powerful
wireless emitter.
2) Able to fake telegrams. According to the balise spec-
ification, telegrams are sent in cleartext and hence the
attacker is able to fake a telegram according to the spec-
ification ETCS SUBSET-036 without being filtered out
by the BTM.
3) Able to install fake balises around/near rails. A fake
balise may be a real balise or merely a transponder.
4) Able to replay telegrams. As a balise will send the
telegram once activated by a BTM, an adversary is able
to know the telegram by impersonating as a BTM.
5) Able to know the train control mechanism and its param-
eters (Kerckhoffs’s Principle [34] or the open design
principle in information security).
6) Restricted to (virtually) displace one balise only a small
distance which will not compromise the security of
transport system. If the displacement is bigger than a
predefined threshold, the displacement can be detected
according to R1 in Section II-G and/or distance estimate
in Section II-D.
7) Unable to destruct balises without being detected.
8) Unable to extract the internal secret data or states of balises.
Since ETCS telegrams are not integrity and timestamp pro-
tected, and on-board distance measurement mechanisms shall
tolerate some errors due to rail conditions and weather dynam-
ics, an adversary is able to exploit these vulnerabilities to start
attacks with malicious wireless signals as follows.
B. Faking Telegrams
In the balise communication system, there are no crypto-
graphic primitives used to defeat malicious adversaries, but
error correction method and mechanical protection against ex-
ternal interference only. Therefore, a naïve attack is to fake a
balise to send arbitrary uplink telegrams. The on-board BTM
cannot filter them out as the faked telegram can pass the
verification process in Section II-B. For instance, if the faked
balise B˜n in Fig. 7 sends a bogus telegram which enables a train
to move along the bend rail at full speed, a derailment tragedy
may be unavoidable. As this faking attack is easy to implement
and cost-effective, the attacker will launch it at the first priority
if possible, otherwise, the following attacks.
Fig. 8. Displacement attack on the movement authority. (Circle) Position of Bi
and (diamond) position of B˜i along a rail. ⊗ is End of Authority (EOA) or E˜OA.
C. Jamming Attack
One straightforward way for an adversary to generate “balise
missing” hazard is to disable air-gap communication by cov-
ering the balise with a Faraday cage. However, this simple
attack can be detected easily by railway workers who carry on
surveillance on the tracks periodically.
A more advanced stealth method is to jam the telegrams
when a train passes over a balise by transmitting signals to BTM
at the same frequency band as the balise does [35]. As intro-
duced in Section II-B, the telegram message is public, hence the
adversary can start the selective and intelligent interfering so as
to be energy-efficient and stealthy. When a train passes over a
balise, the attacker jams a crafted signal to the BTM antenna.
As each telegram has 75 parity bits to correct at most 75/2 =
38 random bit errors, if an adversary is able to randomly change
more than 38 bits of the telegram, BTM will reject the whole
telegram and miss the balise.
As an illustrative example, the communication time between
BTM and balise is about 7 ms when train speed is 350 km/h [7].
Hence, if an adversary randomly interferes with the telegram
channel for at most 38/341 × 7 ≈ 0.78 ms, the BTM will reject
the telegram and VC shows the top-level hazard H4 “balise
missing” on DMI. As a result, the driver has to manually
operate the train and the railway operator has to re-schedule
all the trains affected.
Note that the above attack process is not only able to disrupt
the original telegram transmission, but also able to transmit any
bogus message to the BTM if the jamming signal energy is
always larger than that of the genuine telegram. In this case, the
jamming attack is regarded as a joint jamming-faking attack.
D. Displacement Attack on Movement Authority
As fixed balises always send invariable telegrams, an adver-
sary can easily replay the telegrams anywhere to mislead the
passing trains and control centers. For example, if the balise Bn
is (virtually) moved to the position of B˜n in Fig. 8, its telegram
can still pass the verification of BTM although the balise posi-
tion is incorrect. Nonetheless, due to the distance restriction in
Section II-D, the small balise displacement has little threat to the
transport system. Hence, an attacker aims to displace a balise
by a larger distance while without being detected. This can be
achieved by accumulating several balise displacement as follows.
With reference to Fig. 8, assume that balises B0, B1, . . . , Bn
are placed in a row. The attacker (virtually) displaces them to
new positions, marked as B˜0, B˜1, . . . , B˜n. For ease of exposition,
we assume that B0 stays in its original position, i.e., B˜0 is B0.
Thus the distance between two consecutive balises (group) are
si = pi+1 − pi (5)
s˜i = p˜i+1 − p˜i (6)
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Fig. 9. Displacement attack on the chosen rail sections. (Circle) Position of Bi
and (diamond) position of B˜i along a rail.
where si is the accurate distance calculated from the replayed
telegrams of balises Bi−1 and Bi, and s˜i is the distance between
balises B˜i−1 and B˜i measured with a distance sensor. However,
because BTM cannot distinguish a faked balise from a genuine
balise by checking the format of their telegrams, it is misled to
believe that s˜i is the measured distance between Bi−1 and Bi.
In other words, from the viewpoint of BTM, s˜i is an acceptable
estimate of si. Meanwhile, BTM cannot discover the displace-
ment attack by checking the measured distance because the
attacker ensures the error of measured distance is smaller than
the detection threshold value i, i.e.,
∀ i, s˜i = si + αi ≤ si + i (7)
where α ∈ (0, 1] is a scalar. In normal conditions, the on-board
sensors are able to approximately measure the travel distance,
especially several sensors are used together, hence α ≈ 1 is
chosen in (7). By iteratively applying (5)∼(6), we have the total
displacement of balise Bn as
e = p˜n − pn = (pn−1 + sn)− (p˜n−1 + s˜n)
=
n∑
i=1
si −
n∑
i=1
s˜n ≈
n∑
i=1
i. (8)
According to (8), an attacker successfully displaces a balise
arbitrarily far away without being found by BTM given that
the number of displaced balises is sufficiently large.
With reference to Fig. 8, when a train passes over balise B˜n,
its VC (or control center) will calculate EOA (End of Authority)
based on the replayed telegram of genuine balise Bn. As the
distance between B˜n position (the true train position)4 and
EOA is MA −e only, much smaller than the expected/allocated
distance, the train will pass through EOA, thus train collision
disaster may happen.
E. Displacement Attack on Chosen Rail Sections
Based on the law of physics, a train must reduce its speed
at a curved rail section due to centripetal force. Therefore, if
an adversary chooses to fake the balise close to the curved rail
section, the attack can be more effective than the displacement
attack above. For instance, in Fig. 9, Bn−1 is a balise indicating
the normal high speed, and Bn is a balise indicating the speed
restriction for the following curved rail section. As elaborated in
Section III-D, BTM will miss baliseBn according to the wrongly
measured distance. As fake balise B˜n−1 replays the telegram of
balise Bn−1 such that VC allows the train to run at full speed
between balises B˜n−1 and B˜n, hence the train may derail due
to the same reason as the wreck of Amtrak 188 in USA [37].
4BTM shall read the balise data within ±1 m around balise center, with a
confidence interval of 0.998 [6]. To improve the performance of balise-BTM
connection, optimization technologies such as [36] are proposed.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENT ATTACKS
F. Joint Attack
In the above attacks, jamming attack may result in a minor
“balise missing” threat on any genuine BTM-balise communi-
cation, while faking attack and displacement attack may cause
significant threats but can be mitigated by a genuine BTM-
balise communication. Thus an attacker may launch a joint
attack. Specifically,
• In a joint jamming-faking [or Faking (J)] attack, when a
train passes over a genuine balise, a faked balise creates a
bogus telegram which has correct telegram format, balise
identifier and checksum; then the faked telegram is sent
to the train with higher electromagnetic power than the
genuine one such that VC will accept the faked telegram
rather than the genuine one.
• In a joint jamming-displacing [or Displacement (J)] at-
tack, the attacker installs a faked balise B˜i on the attack
positions p˜i. When a train passes over a genuine balise Bi,
a jamming signal is used to override the communication
of balise-BTM communication by inducing errors. On
the contrary, when a train passes over a faked balise B˜i,
the data stored in balise Bi will be replayed by B˜i. As
VC cannot distinguish faked balises from genuine balises,
the attacker realizes balise displacement successfully in a
stealth way.
Table I summarizes the proposed joint attacks. As the
Faking (J) attack has to change the telegram content, it is
only applicable to unsecured telegrams (column 2). Unlike the
other attacks, Displacement (J) attack needs to tamper more
balises’ telegrams so as to induce a sufficiently large distance
error. Hence, it requires more bogus balises (column 3) and
attack time (column 4) than any other attack. The last column
lists the top-level hazards caused by the attacks. Jamming-only
attack makes the train miss a balise such that the driver has
to reduce the train speed or even stop the train, hence the
railway’s availability or quality of service is reduced; Faking (J)
attack can fabricate any message to pass the verification
such that an erroneous message is accepted by the train; and
Displacement (J) attack misleads the BTM to report the erro-
neous position of balise.
IV. SIMULATIONS
The most important task in the train control technology
of balise-based ATP system is to establish the safety braking
model according to the movement authority. However, the train
control curve model technology is believed to be the key pro-
tected and proprietary technology due to commercial consider-
ations [38] and hence is not available for academic analysis.
Thus, the train system is modeled as in Section II based on
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ETCS standards in the following simulations. As the faking
attack simulation is trivial, we will omit it, and pay attention
on the displacement attack only. In the simulations, we assume
that the measured distance is the accurate travel distance for
simplicity, but the distance calculated from balise telegrams is
inaccurate due to the displacement attack.
A. Displacement Attack on Trains Without Supervision Limits
When two neighbor trains move in the same direction on
the same rail, supervision limits are made available to the train
behind so as to ensure the safe separation distance and travel
comfort. With reference to Section II-F, if the train behind is
beyond P limit, the driver shall be alerted for initiating the ser-
vice brake. Moreover, if the train is beyond EBI limit, the trains
may collide with a high probability. In other words, if the
distance error is more than the limits, but VC thinks the train
is still in a safe region by mistake, there are potentially tragic
consequences. Thus the attacker aims to cause a distance error
which is beyond the supervision limits, without being detected
by the VC.
As a compromise between on-board measurement accuracy
and safety, ETCS SUBSET-041 specifies the accuracy of the
distance measured by on-board sensors: for every measured
distance d˜ the accuracy shall be better or equal to ±(5 + 5%d˜)
in meters [39]. i.e., the VC will not report the “balise missing”
hazard if the error
e′ = d˜− d ≤ 5 + 5%d˜ = 5 + 0.05(d+ e′) (9)
where d˜ is the measured distance of two neighbor balises, and
d is obtained from their telegrams. Rewriting (9) as
e′ ≤ (5 + 0.05d)0.95 = . (10)
For simplicity, assume the distance d between any two orig-
inal balises to be fixed, and each balise is displaced with the
same distance e′. Then according to (8), after n faked balises
are passed over, VC can accept the total travel distance error
e = ne′ ≤ n = n(5 + 0.05d)/0.95, i.e., the minimal number
of displaced balises required for a successful displacement
attack is
n =
⌈
0.95e
5 + 0.05d
⌉
. (11)
As the number of displacement balises varies with the tol-
erable error e which is related to the train characteristics, the
following subsections illustrate the attack effect according to
the train classes. Assume that d = 3000 m as that in [20], the
detection threshold  = 161.2 m for ETCS trains according
to (10).
1) High-Speed Train: Table II illustrates the attack effect on
a high-speed train (300 km/h) whose control curve is shown
in Fig. 10. Using the last row of Table II as an example, the
attacker can lead the train into EBD status if the position error
is above e = 417 + 333 + 365 + 208 = 1323 m according to
Fig. 10. To incur such a distance error e, the attacker shall
use at most n = 9 fake balises for an ETCS victim train. That
TABLE II
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ATTACK EFFORT (300 km/h)
Fig. 10. Distance apportionment for trains at the highest speed of 300 km/h.
Target distance is at 7179 m [18].
TABLE III
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ATTACK EFFORT (160 km/h)
is, the adversary can cause an ETCS train accident by reposi-
tioning at most 9 balises, which is moved e/n = 147 m each.
Within the 340-second attack period, the train actually travels
s˜ = n(d+ e/n) = 28323 m, rather than s = nd = 27 000 m
obtained from the telegrams. As the total distance error e =
s˜− s = 28 323 − 27 000 = 1323 m, the train will pass over
EBD limit. Meanwhile, as the distance error 147 m for the
any track section between two balises is below the detection
threshold  = 161.2, the train cannot identify the attack. Thus,
the attack is launched successfully.
As a comparison, to cause the same accident on an SCMT
train whose measurement error may be up to 20% of the travel
distance [20] [40], an adversary is required to tamper with
n = 0.8e/(5 + 0.2d) = 2 balises only, within 87.9 seconds.
Hence, from Table II, we observe that it is easier to attack the
SCMT train than ETCS counterpart in terms of attack efficiency
and attack effort because SCMT allows the attacker to displace
a balise further.
2) Low-Speed Train: Table III lists the missing limits for
a low-speed train (160 km/h) whose control curve is shown
in Fig. 11. Tables II and III show that it is easier to attack
a low-speed train than a high-speed train. This observation
seems to be in contradiction with our intuition: the slower,
the safer. Indeed, a low-speed train usually has worse brake
characteristics and hence its target distance is shorter. As a
result, the required displacement distance is smaller such that
an adversary is able to use a small amount of fake balises to
start the attack.
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Fig. 11. Distance apportionment for trains at the highest speed of 160 km/h.
Target distance is at 1929 m [18].
B. Displacement Attack on Trains Without Supervision Limits
If the control mechanism of a train does not have supervision
limits, but only using the braking distance curve elaborated in
Section II-E, the attack becomes easier. For instance, given that
the German ICE train is at the speed 300 km/h, the emergency
braking distance is no more than 4000 m [24], which is much
smaller than the supervised distance 7179 m in Fig. 10. Thus,
the number of faked balises required for a successful attack is
smaller according to (11).
V. COUNTERMEASURES
As a railway system always spreads over a very large area
and even through different regions or countries, it is costly to
upgrade the transport infrastructure to defense against mali-
cious attackers. Preferably, the defenses are applicable to the
existing infrastructure without much investment on hardware,
as the following three methods do.
A. Detecting Jamming Attack
In order to exchange messages between trains and operation
centers, wireless communication is the most important means
at present. Clearly an attacker is always able to interrupt the
wireless channel by starting jamming attack. In other words,
the “balise missing” hazard cannot be avoided theoretically if
jamming attack is launched. Nonetheless, the jamming signal
can be detected and alerted by the BTM such that the effects
of the joint attacks shown in the Table I can be significantly
weakened, and then the hazards are greatly alleviated.
Denote by u(t) = ub(t) + ua(t) the signal received by BTM,
where ub(t) is the component sent from the balise and ua(t) is
the counterpart sent from the attacker. According to [35], if the
energy ‖ua(t)‖ is sufficiently greater than the energy ‖ub(t)‖,
the telegram is erroneous. That is to say, if there is a successful
jamming attack, the received energy
‖u(t)‖ = ‖ua(t) + ub(t) + n(t)‖ ≥ 2 ‖ub(t)‖+ ‖n(t)‖
otherwise
‖u(t)‖ = ‖ub(t) + n(t)‖ ≈ ‖ub(t)‖ + ‖n(t)‖
where ‖ub(t)‖ is approximately constant or known to BTM
in advance. Therefore, if the received electromagnetic power
Fig. 12. Antireplay attack protocol.
is larger than a predefined threshold, the BTM will report the
existence of jamming attack, and alarm the driver and/or control
center. Unfortunately, this countermeasure does not work if the
attacker tampers/covers the target balises in order to fake or
replay telegrams. In this case, advanced countermeasures such
as the ones given below, are needed.
B. Mitigating Faking Attack
The faking attack presented in Section III-B exploits the vul-
nerability that the telegram is in plaintext. Hence, if a telegram
is protected with message authentication code (MAC) or digital
signature, this attack can be defeated. Luckily, it is easy to
append the authentication data to the “other information” field
of the telegram such that the extended telegram is compatible
with non-upgraded trains.
For a controllable balise, authentication data can be created
together with the message whenever the message is changed
by LEU/center. But for a fixed balise, the telegrams cannot
be updated online. Nonetheless, ETCS specifies that “there
is an optional interface defined for programming the Fixed
Telegram (for Fixed Balises) . . . into the Balise using wire aided
programming when applicable” [6]. Thus, it is also possible to
insert authentication data to fixed balises offline so as to defeat
the faking attack.
The cryptographic primitives are effective tools in defeating
telegram faking, but they fail to deter replay attacks such
as Displacement attack. To defeat these attacks, a challenge-
response protection mechanism shall be employed.
C. Defeating Replay Attack
Although the balise specification [6] defines both uplink and
downlink channels between balise and BTM, the downlink
is not used in most of the deployed systems in practice. We
propose to use the downlink channel for controllable balise so
as to defeat the replay attacks, including Displacement attack,
presented in Section III. With regard to Fig. 12, the anti-replay
attack protocol works as follows.
1) Assume a train shares a crypto-key k with each LEU
along the route, and synchronizes with all the LEUs
before the train starts to be on duty.
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2) The LEU generates a telegram which includes message
M1, current timestamp T1, and the message authentica-
tion code MAC1 = H(M1, T1, k) where H(·) is a one-
way function. Both T1 and MAC1 are inserted into the
“other information” field of the telegram for compatibil-
ity with non-upgraded trains. The telegram is transmitted
to the controllable balise.
3) LEU will repeat step 2) periodically.5
4) When a train passes over the balise, BTM telepowers and
activates the balise. At the beginning of its start-up, the
balise sends an activation notice to the LEU [6], and the
LEU notes down the activation time t0 and starts a clock.
5) After the balise starts up, the uplink telegram is trans-
ferred to the BTM via air-gap interface. After reading
the telegram, BTM carries on the normal verification in
Section II-G. If positive, BTM will parse the “other infor-
mation” to extract the MAC1. If the telegram is authentic
and timestamp T1 is within a reasonable interval, the
BTM creates a message M2 which links to the received
uplink telegram, and replies to the balise a downlink
telegram which includes reply message M2, timestamp
T2 and authentication code MAC2 = H(M2, T2, k).
6) The balise forwards the downlink message to the LEU.
7) Upon receiving the downlink message, the LEU stops
the clock and notes down the time t1. The LEU verifies
the telegram with MAC2, and checks whether time lapse
T = t1 − t0 is less than a predefined threshold. If any
of them is negative, the LEU reports the existence of
attacks.
In this countermeasure, because the train passage time T
is restricted to be smaller than a threshold value, the replay
attack fails as explained below. To start the replay/displacement
attack, a determined attacker may take the following strategy:
1) Place a fake balise B˜n which has distance e away from
Bn in advance.
2) Once Bn is passed over by a train and automatically
sends activation signal to the LEU, the attacker will jam
the uplink such that the train cannot receive the correct
telegram.
3) Once B˜n is passed over and receives the reply message
via the downlink, the message is forwarded to the LEU
via Bn.
In this process, the LEU knows the activation time t0 in step 2)
and the reply time t˜1 in step 3). Thus, the LEU calculates the
lapse time as T˜ = t˜1 − t0 = (t1 + (e/v))− t0 = T + (e/v),
where t1 is the reply time if there is no attack. Given that the
train speed v = 300 km/h (i.e., 83.3 m/s) and the displacement
distance e = 100 m, the lapse difference T˜ − T = 100/83.3 =
1.2 s. As the lapse difference is sufficiently large, the LEU
is able to detect the displacement attack. Correspondingly, the
train can detect the displacement attack by calculating the time
difference T2 − T1 if the period which the LEU updates the
telegram is short (e.g., 100 ms).
5According to specification [6], upon receiving the activation signal, LEU
shall block telegram switching for a minimum time of 10 ms. The maximum
blocking time is dependent on system requirements.
In addition, when the above protocol is deployed, the
faking (J) attack fails if the attacker does not compromise the
cryptographic key.
VI. CONCLUSION
Balises play an important role in the positioning mechanism
of modern rail transport systems. If balises are positioned
incorrectly, the movement authority of a train will be wrong
such that serious accidents may happen.
Although the ETCS specifications are designed to correct
accidental position errors, they totally ignore malicious tamper-
ing of the air-gap communication channel. This paper exploits
the potential security flaws in the channel, including jamming,
faking telegram, re-positioning of balise and telegram replay-
ing. It also proposes countermeasures to improve security of
ETCS. In our countermeasures, the downlink channel is used
for delivering train messages to the ground devices so as to
detect the attacks. Furthermore, if a continuous train-to-track
channel is available, the real-time control signal can be sent to
the train so as to fully defeat the attacks.
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